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Morrison: Labor and Employment

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ALLENv. TOMBLIN, No. 17119, slip op. (W. Va. July 11, 1986).
Civil Service Appointments-DiscretionaryAuthority of Appointing Officer
In this mandamus proceeding, petitioner sought a writ compelling the sheriff
to appoint her to the next available position as a county correctional officer. The
sheriff had hired eight people as county correctional officers, six of whom scored
lower on the civil service exam than the petitioner. The sheriff had objected to
petitioner's eligibility on the basis that she falsified her application with respect
to her high school records, her references were weak, and she lacked the selfconfidence necessary for the job.
The main issue was whether the petitioner satisfied the criteria for obtaining
relief in mandamus, i.e., had she demonstrated a clear right to the relief sought,
a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing she sought, and
the absence of another adequate remedy at law.
The court held the fact that petitioner was certified as eligible for appointment
as a correctional officer did not confer upon her any guarantee or legal entitlement
to such appointment, nor did it impose any nondiscretionary legal duty on the
part of the sheriff to appoint her as a correctional officer; under the provisions
of West Virginia Code section 7-14B-1 1, the sheriff was vested with the authority
to exercise his best judgment, considering the relative merit and fitness of the
candidates certified to him, in making an appointment.
BREWSTER v. RUTLEDGE, 342 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1986).
Good Cause fior Resignation-Qualificationfor denefts- Unemployment Compensation
In this case, an employee was given additional job duties, while at the same
time his pay was substantially reduced. He resigned and applied for unemployment
benefits. The Board of Review denied him benefits on the ground that he quit
work voluntarily and without "good cause involving fault on the part of the
employer" as per West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(l).
The issue was whether the claimant had demonstrated that he did not quit
his job voluntarily and without good cause involving fault on the part of his
employer, and was therefore qualified for unemployment compensation benefits.
The court held that increasing the claimant's occupational duties while substantially reducing his pay constitutes a substantial unilateral change in the terms
and conditions of employment and constitutes "good cause" for resignation under
West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(1) and precluded disqualifications from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.
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FLANIGAN v. WEST VIRGINIA PUB. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, 342 S.E.2d 414 (W. Va. 1986).
Eligibility-Interrelationshipbetween Retirement Systems-Remedies for Denial
In this proceeding a magistrate sought a writ mandating his enrollment into
the West Virginia Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). Magistrate was
formerly employed by the school board, where he was a contributing member of
the State Teachers Retirement System (TRS). When he assumed his full time duties
as a magistrate, he inquired into his eligibility for PERS. The State Court Administrator's office advised him that he was excluded from PERS because of his
TRS eligibility. He then elected to begin receiving TRS benefits.
The main issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to enroll in PERS,
retroactively or prospectively, while being retired under the TRS.
The court held that under the transfer provision of the PERS Act, West
Virginia Code section 5-10-14, the petitioner was clearly eligible to participate in
PERS and, after three years, transfer his TRS service credits to PERS; since
petitioner elected to start receiving TRS benefits after relying upon the Administrator's determination that he could not participate in PERS, in order to get
full retroactive enrollment in PERS he must pay his statutorily required employee
contribution for the period and repay all benefits received from the TRS for the
same years.
FRANK'S SHOE STORE v. WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N,
No. 16913, slip op. (W. Va. July 10, 1986).
Burden of Proof-Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination-Remedies-Standardof
Judicial Review
When an employee became pregnant, her employer reduced her duties and
her work week from five days to three days, even though she wanted to continue
working in her full capacity. She filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging
sex discrimination, and was soon thereafter discharged. She then filed another
complaint charging that she was illegally terminated for having filed the initial
complaint with the Commission.
The issues before the court included: (1) Whether discrimination based upon
pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination pursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act, West Virginia Code section 5-11-9; (2) whether appellant had
satisfied her burden of proof in regard to the specific discriminatory allegations
with which she had charged her employer; (3) whether the appellant was discharged by her employer in retaliation for her filing a complaint with the Commission alleging discrimination based on sex; (4) whether an award of back pay
was an appropriate remedy and, if so, what was the proper amount of the award;
and (5) whether the circuit court, in substituting its findings of fact for those of
the agency charged with enforcement of the West Virginia Human Rights Act,
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erred by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review set forth in West
Virginia Code section 29A-5-4(g).
The court held: (1) Discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal
sex discrimination under West Virginia Code section 5-11-9(a); (2) appellant has
demonstrated that she was a member of a protected class, that she was capable
of performing her normal duties, that her duties were reduced because of her
pregnant condition, and that no males actually or potentially could be treated
similarly; when a pregnant employee who capably performs her duties experiences
a reduction in work hours solely because of her pregnant condition, such action
by the employer constitutes illegal discrimination based upon the employee's sex
and is violative of West Virginia Code, section 5-11-9(a); (3) in an action to redress
unlawful retaliatory discharge under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, West
Virginia Code section 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that the complainant
engaged in protected activity, (b) that complainant's employer was aware of the
protected activities, (c) that complainant was subsequently discharged and, absent
other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation, (d) that complainant's
discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that
the court can infer retaliatory motivation; the Commission's finding of retaliatory
discharge was supported by substantial evidence in the record; (4) an award of
back pay is proper in a case where an employer has violated West Virginia Code
section 5-11-9(a) by reducing work hours for discriminatory reasons of a pregnant
employee and ultimately discharging her in retaliation for her involvement in
protected activities; the appellant is entitled to an award representing the amount
she lost as a result of the reduction in her work hours, as well as an additional
award representing the amount she lost as a result of the appellee's retaliation
in discharging her, plus pre-judgment interest thereon; and (5) the final order of
the circuit court conflicted with the standard of review required by the State
Administrative Procedures Act. The record demonstrated that the State Commission's findings were not clearly wrong, but were substantiated by evidence on
the record as a whole.
FREEMAN v. POLING, 338 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1985).
Due Process-Libertyand Property Interests-PoliticalDiscrimination
When a new sheriff assumed office, she discharged the four appellants and
one other employee, and hired new deputies of her own choosing. Appellants
protested their dismissals, claiming they had assurances from the outgoing sheriff
that their jobs would be protected under the new civil service system, and alleging
political discrimination (the three Republicans and one Democrat were replaced
by four Democrats).
The issues in this case were: (1) Whether the sheriff's decision to replace the
four appellants with deputies of her own choosing was a deprivation of a property
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or liberty interest without due process of law, and (2) whether appellants had
proven that their dismissal was politically motivated.
The court held that (1) Where appellants had unreasonably relied on an unlawful or ultra vires promise of the ex-sheriff and none of them met the objective
criteria of civil service protection, appellants had no legitimate expectation of
continued employment and therefore were not denied a property interest without
due process of law; unexplained termination or discharge from employment with
no public disclosure of any accusations against the employee does not create a
sufficient stigma to invoke a liberty interest; and (2) in weighing all the evidence
submitted by both parties, the circuit court did not err in finding that appellants
had not proven that political affiliations were a substantial or motivating factor
in their discharge.
In re GORBY, 339 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1985).
DisciplinaryProceedings-JudicialCode of Ethics
In this case, the magistrate petitioned for a reduction of his sentence of six
months suspension without pay after the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found he had violated Canon 2A of the Judicial Code of Ethics by his involvement
in a series of altercations at a high school football game. He asserted his conformance with the Code since the order, and his remorse over the past incident.
The issues addressed by the court were: (1) What is the purpose of judicial
disciplinary proceedings, and (2) under what circumstances are modifications of
sanctions appropriate.
The court held that the purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is the
preservation and enhancement of public confidence in the honor, dignity, integrity, and efficiency of the members of the judiciary and the system of justice;
the modification of sanctions previously imposed is appropriate where the petitioner is not only remorseful with respect to past misconduct, but evidences a
heightened sensitivity to the maintenance of public respect for the judiciary and
its officers. Suspension without pay was reduced from six months to five months.
GORDON v. RUTLEDGE, 337 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1985).
Burden of Proof-Qualificationfor Benefits- Unemployment Compensation
In this action, claimant employees went on strike after negotiations for a new
agreement broke down, and applied for unemployment benefits. Under West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(4) a claimant is disqualified from unemployment benefits if he is not working because of a labor dispute unless, among other exceptions,
he is required to accept wages, hours, or conditions substantially less favorable
than those prevailing for similar work in the area. At unemployment compensation
hearings, claimants presented evidence that three other employers in the area paid
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substantially higher wages. The employer presented evidence that two other employers had a standard hourly wage equal to or less than its offer.
The issue in this case was whether the claimants had demonstrated that they
fell within one of the exceptions under West Virgifiia Code section 21A-6-3(4)
and were therefore qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
The court held that the employees had met their burden of proving that the
higher wages they cited as the prevailing wage was for similar work in the area
and thus they were qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
HOSAFLOOK v. NESTOR, 346 S.E.2d 798 (W. Va. 1986).
ProceduralRights-Statutory Protections-Transferfrom ExtracurricularDuties
The Board of Education of Upshur County voted to not renew appellant's
coaching contract after the County Superintendent had notified appellant of the
reasons for nonrenewal, and after hearings were held. The State Superintendent
found that no prior written evaluations were made as required by State School
Board Policy 5300(6)(a).
The court addressed the following issues: (1) Whether appellant in his capacity
as a coach was entitled to the procedural protections of West Virginia Code section
18A-2-7 governing regular teaching and service contracts, and (2) whether the
written evaluation requirements of Policy 5300(6)(a) was applicable to football
coach positions.
The court held that: (1) The procedural requirements of West Virginia Code
sections 18A-2-7 and 18A-2-8 clearly apply to all school personnel positions; school
board actions relating to contracts entered into pursuant to West Virginia Code
section 18A-4-16 are not exempt from such requirements; (2) failure to evaluate
the appellant and to afford him an opportunity to improve, according to the
mandate of Policy 5300(6)(a), entitled him to reinstatement to his football coaching position.
PENNINGTON v. COLE, 336 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1985).
Burden of Proof-Qualificationfor Benefits- Unemployment Compensation
In this case, claimant employees went on strike for higher wages. Under West
Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(4) a claimant is disqualified from unemployment
benefits if he is not working because of a labor dispute unless, among other
exceptions, he is required to accept wages, hours, or conditions substantially less
favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the area. At unemployment
compensation hearings, claimants introduced testimony and evidence that other
union workers in the area were paid at a higher wage rate and worked fewer
hours than claimants.
The issue in this case was whether claimants had demonstrated that they fell
within one of the exceptions under West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(4) and
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were therefore qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
The court held that absent any counter-evidence from the employer, claimants'
evidence was sufficient to show that they were being paid at a substantially lower
rate than the prevailing wage for similar work in the area, and were therefore
qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits.
PULLANO v. CITY OF BLUEFIELD, 342 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1986).
Holiday and Overtime Pay-Method of Calculation-StatutoryRights
This case involved the statutory rights of municipal police officers and firefighters to holiday pay under West Virginia Code sections 8-14-2a and 8-1510a, and the method of calculating overtime pay for firefighters.
The following questions were raised in this case: (1) Whether municipalities
are required to recognize as legal holidays the days recommended by a governor
in memoranda to all State spending units as nonworking days for State employees
in calculating holiday pay for their police officers under West Virginia Code
section 8-14-2a, and their firefighters under West Virginia Code section 8-15-10a;
(2) whether holiday pay under West Virginia Code sections 8-14-2a and 8-15-10a,
is to be paid in addition to the regular or overtime pay also earned on that holiday;
(3) whether the City of Bluefield correctly calculated overtime pay for its firefighters.
The court held that: (1) Absent the clear intent by a governor to appoint or
recommend an additional legal holiday pursuant to West Virginia Code section
2-2-1, no legal holiday is created when he simply recommends that State employees
be given all or part of a day off; therefore, the extra compensation provisions
provided in West Virginia Code sections 8-14-2a and 8-15-10a were not triggered
by Governor Rockefeller's memoranda. In addition, the legislature's failure in
1977 to include Martin Luther King Day within the legal holiday statute, West
Virginia Code section 2-2-1, foreclosed this day from triggering the special holiday
pay provisions of West Virginia Code sections 8-14-2a and 8-15-10a; (2) under
West Virginia Code sections 8-14-2a and 8-15-10a, police officers and firefighters
must be paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay when they are
required to work on a legal holiday or when such holiday falls on their regular
scheduled day off, provided they are not accorded equal time off; but where a
firefighter works overtime under West Virginia Code section 21-5C-3(a), and such
overtime work is performed on a legal holiday, he is entitled to two times his
regular rate of pay for the overtime hours worked; (3) the provisions of the wage
and hour law, West Virginia Code section 21-5C-3(a), will be satisfied where (a)
firefighters know in advance their regular hourly rate of pay, their average number
of weekly hours to be worked each week, including a definite number of overtime
hours over the forty-hour regular work week, and their total annual salary; and
(b) the forty regular hours when multiplied by the regular rate of pay is combined
with the overtime hours scheduled to be worked each week compensated at one
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and one-half times the regular rate of pay and this sum when annualized equals
the stated annual pay.
ROSS v. RUTLEDGE, 338 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1985).
Good Cause for Resignation- Unemployment Compensation Benefits
Soon after their employer relocated one of its plants twenty miles away, ten
employees quit their jobs because of hardships caused by the added time and
expense due to the longer distance to work. Under West Virginia Code section
21A-6-3, an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he
or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of
the employer. After an evidentiary hearing, the Board of Review found the claimants disqualified.
The issue was whether the claimants showed good cause for not continuing
to work at the relocated plant and are therefore qualified to receive unemployment
compensation benefits.
The court held that under West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3, a job relocation due to an employer's decision to move may constitute a substantial unilateral change in the conditions of employment furnishing good cause for leaving
work where the claimant demonstrates that transportation problems or other hardships created by the employer's move imposed necessitous or compelling reasons
to cease employment; appellants are therefore not disqualified from receipt of
unemployment benefits.
SMITH v. BOARD OF EDUC., 341 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1985).
Dismissalfrom ExtracurricularDuties-ProceduralRights-Statutory Protections
In this case, a football coach appealed decision of the Board of Education,
upheld by the circuit court, dismissing him as head football coach with no advance
notice and no statement of reasons either before or after the decision.
The issue addressed by the court was whether West Virginia Code section
18A-4-16, which provides for a separate contract with teachers and service personnel for extracurricular assignments, was subject to the same procedural rights
and protections afforded by sections 18A-2-7 and 18A-2-8 which govern dismissal
or transfer under regular teaching and service contracts.
The court held that the procedural requirements of West Virginia Code section
18A-2-7 and 18A-2-8 clearly apply to all school personnel positions; school board
actions relating to contracts entered into pursuant to West Virginia Code section
18A-4-16 are not exempt from such requirements; nonrenewal of a teacher's
coaching contract is a transfer and is subject to the statutory procedural protections of the 'Code; because of the Board's failure to follow procedures, the
football coach is entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
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STATE ex rel. NORTON v. BOARD OF REGENTS, No. 16907, slip op. (W. Va.
Apr. 3, 1986).
Arbitrary Denial-Remedies- Tenure Proceedings
In this mandamus proceeding, a college faculty member had twice been evaluated for tenure, twice denied, and was facing a third evaluation. On appeal of
the first denial, this court directed that a proper tenure evaluation be conducted
in accordance with procedures outlined by a hearing examiner. On appeal of the
second denial, another hearing examiner found that the majority of the tenure
evaluation committee used no identifiable tenure standards or criteria; the minority
who set criteria found that the teacher satisfied or exceeded them.
The issue addressed by the court was whether, after a faculty member has
twice been improperly evaluated for tenure and is facing a third evaluation, a
writ of mandamus should be granted requiring the Board of Regents to grant
him tenure.
The court held that given the probably unique factual situation presented and
the substantial evidence to justify granting tenure, the writ prayed for should be
awarded and the potentially endless tenure review process brought to an end by
granting the petitioner tenure.
PatriciaA. Morrison
See also,
ADzINSTRATIVE LAW:
Pride, Inc. v. State ex rel. State of W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 346
S.E.2d 356 (W. Va. 1986).
Rogliano v. Fayette County, 347 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1986).
State ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Casey, 349 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

Barron v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension and Relief Fund, 345
S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1985).
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